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FROM BUSH V. GORE TO NAMUDNO: A RESPONSE TO 
PROFESSOR AMAR 
Ellen D. Katz* 
INTRODUCTION 
In his Dunwody Lecture, Professor Akhil Amar invites us to revisit 
the Bush v. Gore controversy and consider what went wrong.1 This 
short essay responds to Professor Amar by taking up his invitation and 
looking at the decision through a seemingly improbable lens, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision last June in Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District No. One (NAMUDNO) v. Holder.2 Among its many 
surprises, NAMUDNO helps illuminate the Court’s fundamental error 
nine years ago. 
Professor Amar forcefully argues that the mistrust with which the 
Justices in the Bush v. Gore majority viewed the Florida Supreme Court 
was both unjustified and disastrously consequential.3 What NAMUDNO 
helps us see is that such mistrust, be it mistaken or warranted, is not 
necessarily incompatible with a sound judicial response. NAMUDNO 
shows that the Court’s most profound error in Bush v. Gore was not the 
premise from which the Justices began, though flawed it may have 
been, but rather where they went from there.4 
CONNECTING BUSH V. GORE TO NAMUDNO 
Facially, Bush v. Gore and NAMUDNO appear unrelated. Bush v. 
Gore famously closed down a court-ordered statewide recount in 
Florida and effectively ended the 2000 presidential election dispute.5 
NAMUDNO sidestepped the question of congressional power to 
reauthorize § 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)—a provision requiring 
jurisdictions with a history of discrimination in voting to obtain federal 
approval prior to changing any aspect of their voting law.6 
The decisions involved distinct legal questions and i stitutional 
actors, and differences between the cases abound. Bush v. Gore and 
NAMUDNO are nevertheless linked in two important ways. 
 
 
                                                                                                           
 * Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
 1. Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution, 61 FLA. L. REV. 945 
(2009). 
 2. 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). 
 3. Amar, supra note 1, at 950–51, 961.  
 4. See infra notes 28–49 and accompanying text. 
 5. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105–06 (2000) (per curiam). 
 6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). 
992 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
Fabricated Intent 
In both Bush v. Gore and NAMUDNO, the Court said something that 
was patently false. The Bush v. Gore majority attributed to the Florida 
Supreme Court a statement the state court never made. NAMUDNO, for 
its part, said Congress meant to allow something it never intended to 
allow.  
In Bush v. Gore, the false statement was the Court’s assertion that 
“the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature 
intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C  § 5 [.]”7 The 
Bush v. Gore majority offered this statement as explanation for its 
refusal to let the state court craft a remedy for the constitutional defect it 
identified in the Florida recount process.8 Remanding for remedial 
action was not possible, said the Court, because the Florida Supreme 
Court had already said that state law did not allow f r such a remedy.9 
The problem was that the Florida Supreme Court never made this 
statement. In fact, the Florida court had no occasion whatsoever to 
address whether the state’s interest in participating voluntarily in one 
aspect of the federal system (i.e., the so-called “safe harbor”) 
outweighed the competing interests underlying the recount.  The Florida 
court had made a tangential reference to the federal system in an earlier 
opinion addressing a distinct point,10 but that reference hardly 
constituted an unequivocal statement of state law on point. The Bush v. 
Gore majority nevertheless said that it was an unequivocal statement, an 
assertion Larry Kramer vividly labeled “nothing less than a deliberate, 
bold-faced lie.”11 
A similar charge might be lodged against the Court’s holding in 
NAMUDNO. There, all nine Justices agreed that the VRA allowed the 
plaintiff to apply for a statutory exemption that Congress never 
authorized and never intended to allow. 
The VRA allows a “political subdivision” to seek this exemption, 
known as bailout, but defines a “political subdivision” in terms that 
facially exclude the plaintiff in NAMUDNO. The Austin Water District 
was neither a county nor a state subdivision “which onducts 
                                                                                                           
 7. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237 (Fla. 2000) 
(citing 3 U.S.C. §§ 1–10 (2006), which govern the federal electoral process).  
 11. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court in Politics, in THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 
2000 105, 149 (Jack N. Rakove ed., Basic Books 2001); see also David A. Strauss, Bush v 
Gore: What Were They Thinking?, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 184, 
204 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., University of Chicago Press 2001) 
[hereinafter THE VOTE] (concluding “that the [U.S. Supreme] Court ‘trumped’ the ‘supposed 
lawlessness’ of the Florida Supreme Court with [itsown] lawlessness”) (internal quotation 
marks added). 
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registration for voting” when the county does not.12 The Court 
nevertheless concluded that the plaintiff was eligib e for the exemption 
based on a contrived statutory construction that, as Rick Hasen pointed 
out, “virtually no lawyer thought was plausible.”13  
Chief Justice Roberts seemed well aware of this. He acknowledged 
that the holding required the Court to take an “unusual” step and ignore 
an explicit statutory definition, and that circumstances existed in which 
the district court’s contrary holding of ineligibility “might well be 
correct.”14 The Chief Justice did not bother to address either t  
legislative history or a Justice Department regulation that directly 
contradicted what the Court read the 1982 VRA amendents to have 
accomplished.15 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts anemically posited that 
“[i]t is unlikely” Congress intended for the bailout provision to have an 
effect that was, in fact, well-documented and universally understood 
when Congress reauthorized the statute in 2006.16 
The Court’s improbable ruling in NAMUDNO, much like its false 
statement in Bush v. Gore, invites speculation. Did Chief Justice 
Roberts “blink,” and shy away from striking down a resonant statute he 
believed to be unconstitutional?17 Or did he simply lack the votes to 
strike down a regime he wanted to invalidate?18 Did the so-called liberal 
Justices strategically sign on without comment to block invalidation of 
the VRA, or did they too harbor serious qualms about the statute’s 
validity?19  
Needless to say, looking beyond the text of an opini n to decode 
hidden intent is a fraught enterprise. Recognizing that speculation is the 
best we can do, the next section suggests that the fals  statements in 




                                                                                                           
 12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (2006). 
 13. See Initial Thoughts on NAMUDNO: Chief Justice Roberts Blinked, 
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013903.html (June 22, 2009, 08:00 EST) [hereinafter Initial 
Thoughts]. 
 14. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2514 (2009). 
 15. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 2 (1981) (“The standard for bail-out is broadened 
to permit political subdivisions, as defined in Section 14(c)(2), in covered states to seek to bail 
out although the state itself may remain covered.”); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 57 n.192 (1982) 
(“Towns and cities within counties may not bailout separately.”); Judicial Administration, 28 
C.F.R. §§ 51.2, 51.5 (2008); Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486 (Jan. 6, 1987). 
 16. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2516. 
 17. Initial Thoughts, supra note 13. 
 18. David G. Savage, A Rare Week of Harmony on High Court, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 
2009, at A10, available at 2009 WLNR 12385782 (discussing this point). 
 19. Id. 
994 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
Failed Deliberation 
Animating the Court in both Bush v. Gore and NAMUDNO was the 
belief that the measures under challenge in both cases were the product 
of failed deliberation. This belief posits that the Florida Supreme Court 
ordered a recount and that Congress renewed the Voting Rights Act not 
as considered judgments but instead as unreflective means to advance 
raw political preferences. Both institutions were se n to have abandoned 
their obligation to deliberate prior to ordering the contested measures.  
In Bush v. Gore, this belief originated in a series of strained statutory 
rulings issued by the Florida Supreme Court in the early weeks of the 
2000 presidential election dispute.20 These rulings gave rise to the belief 
that the state court was neither interested in nor engaged in the act of 
judging at all. To the Justices in the Bush v. Gore majority (and to other 
observers),21 the state court appeared to be fixated on handing the 
election to Vice President Gore.22 A given ruling might find legal 
support but that fact was beside the point. Intent mattered, and the 
Florida court—at least in the eyes of the Bush v. Gore majority—had 
the wrong intent. 
Intent appears to have mattered in NAMUDNO as well. Here the 
Justices thought Congress had the wrong intent when it voted in 2006 to 
renew the VRA. This view posits that Congress saw the VRA as too 
sacrosanct to let lapse, and would have reauthorized the statute 
regardless of whether contemporary conditions justified it.23  Congress, 
to be sure, amassed a detailed evidentiary record, but, the argument 
goes, that it did so not to guide its decision-making, but rather to justify 
a decision it had already made.  
This view is a plausible one. The VRA has tremendous symbolic 
resonance, even while its specific terms remain largely obscure. With 
few exceptions,24 members of Congress had little desire to seek re-
election as someone who had voted against the VRA.25 s Justice 
Scalia pointedly asked at oral argument, “[D]o you ever seriously 
                                                                                                           
 20. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1239–40 (Fla. 
2000). 
 21. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Two–and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v Gore, in THE 
VOTE, supra note 11, at 98, 101 (noting with disapproval that t e Florida Supreme Court ruled 
for Gore each time). 
 22. See Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its 
Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 194 & nn.64, 66 (2001).  
 23. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act and 
Noisy Statutory Interpretation (draft). 
 24. See Carl Hulse, Rebellion Stalls Extension of Voting Act, N.Y.TIMES, June 22, 2006, at 
A23, available at 2006 WLNR 10749989 (noting that only a few House mmbers did not 
support the bill). 
 25. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, By a Vote of 98-0, Senate Approves 25-Year Extension of Voting 
Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2006, at A16, available at 2006 WLNR 12545848. 
2009] DUNWODY COMMENTARY 995 
 
expect Congress to vote against a re-extension of the Voting Rights 
Act?”26 
That reauthorization appeared fated, however, does n t mean it was 
unwarranted. The sizeable record Congress amassed to support 
reauthorization contained considerable, albeit not u equivocal, evidence 
supporting the claim that § 5 of the VRA was still needed.27 In other 
words, reauthorization might have been both warranted and 
preordained, just as the rulings issued by the Florida Supreme Court 
might have comported both with the law and a predisposition for a Gore 
victory. In both cases, a truly deliberative process might have yielded 
the very measures the decisionmakers selected.  But, in the eyes of the 
Court, neither of the challenged measures had in fact emerged from 
such a process. Deliberation had failed and that failure required a 
judicial response.  
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FAILED DELIBERATION 
Professor Amar’s remarks model one way a reviewing court might 
respond to failed deliberation. Specifically, a court might provide an 
insufficiently deliberative decision with its missing rationale. Professor 
Amar does this when he drafts the opinion he thinks the Florida 
Supreme Court should have issued.28 Professor Amar posits that the 
Florida court’s rulings were legitimate because his draft opinion shows 
them to be “legally defensible.”29 
This approach bears a rough resemblance to what Justice Brennan 
did elsewhere in saying “[i]t is enough that we be able to perceive a 
basis upon which” the challenged decision might have been reached.30 
Writing for the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, Justice Brennan upheld 
congressional power to enact § 4(e) of the VRA of 1965.31 His opinion 
never accused Congress of failing to deliberate over th  measure, and 
indeed seemed skeptical of Justice Harlan’s dissenting allusion to a 
failure of this sort.32 Regardless, Justice Brennan’s analysis made clear 
that failed deliberation would be of no consequence. So long as the 
                                                                                                           
 26. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (No. 08-322). 
 27. See, e.g., NAMUDNO v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 247–66 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(discussing this evidence). 
 28. Amar, supra note 1, at 953–56. 
 29. Amar, supra note 1, at 955–56 (stating that the Florida Supreme Court “did the right 
legal things and for the right legal reasons”). 
 30. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966). 
 31. Id. at 646–47. 
 32. Compare id. at 669 & n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]here is simply no 
legislative record supporting such hypothesized discrimination of the sort we have hitherto 
insisted upon” and that there “were no committee hearings or reports referring to this section, 
which was introduced from the floor.”), with id. at 645 n.3 (majority opinion) (discussing 
legislative history to § 4(e)). 
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Justices could “perceive” a basis on which 4(e) might be needed, and 
craft their own argument, the statute was valid.33 
Much like Justice Brennan in Morgan, Professor Amar equates his 
ability to “perceive” a basis for the Florida court’s rulings with their 
legitimacy. He disputes the notion that the Florida court failed to 
deliberate precisely because the opinion he has drafte  employs sound 
interpretive methods to reach the same results.34 Professor Amar 
laments the fact that “[t]he Florida Justices never offered up such a crisp 
and cogent Article II explanation of their conduct in the 2000 
election.”35 Had they done so, Amar suggests, the legitimacy of the 
court’s conduct—and “the basic error” in claims to the contrary—
“would have been clear for all to see.”36  
Perhaps the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court would not have 
harbored the suspicions they held had the Florida Supreme Court issued 
the exemplary Amar opinion in the first instance. But to do so, the state 
court would have needed to anticipate federal issues that were obscure 
prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s first per curiam opinion in the 
dispute. By the time the Florida court had the opportunity to address 
these issues on remand, the damage had been done. The Bush v. Gore 
majority no longer trusted the state court and, I suspect, nothing the 
Florida court could have said—including what Professor Amar says in 
his opinion—would have changed that.  
In fact, the Bush v. Gore majority confronted versions of the 
explanation the Amar opinion offers—less crisp, less cogent perhaps, 
but comprehensible versions nevertheless. These Justices understood 
well that sound interpretative methods could have produced the very 
results reached by the Florida court. They, however, also believed that 
such methods had not in fact served as the state court’s guide.37  
To the majority in Bush v. Gore, actual intent mattered. Partisan bias 
for a preordained result was not judicial craft—and could not become 
craft simply by tacking on (even good) legal argument. The Bush v. 
Gore majority consequently had no interest in judicial review of the sort 
Professor Amar models, or even the more rigorous, “show your work” 
approach the Rehnquist Court had developed in Morgan’s stead.38  
What the Court did instead was to eliminate review entirely. The 
Bush v. Gore majority equated a failure of deliberation with an 
abdication of responsibility, and viewed it as cause to step into the shoes 
                                                                                                           
 33. Id. at 653. 
 34. Amar, supra note 1, at 954. 
 35. Amar, supra note 1, at 955. 
 36. Amar, supra note 1, at 953–54. 
 37. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 11, at 204 (questioning whether the Supreme Court 
Justices’ view of the Florida Supreme Court was correct).  
 38. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997). 
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of the Florida Supreme Court.  These Justices decided the case as if they 
themselves were members of the state court, and decreed (albeit through 
false attribution) that Florida law allowed no remedy for the 
constitutionally defective recount.39 In so doing, they wholly eliminated 
the state court’s decision-making power.  
Scores of commentators have explained why this was a very bad 
idea.40 The Court in NAMUDNO nevertheless seemed poised to follow 
this approach with regard to Congress. The district court in NAMUDNO 
had already issued an opinion much like Professor Amar’s in that it 
labored to provide the strongest possible defense for the decision under 
review. Judge Tatel’s lengthy opinion for the unanimous panel carefully 
parsed the congressional record for every shred of supporting evidence 
and developed a legal argument to justify the 2006 reauthorization.41 
The Justices in NAMUDNO, however, were not interested in this 
approach. At oral argument, many of the Justices semed indifferent to 
Congress’s judgment that the VRA remained necessary. Question after 
question asked not whether Congress had the power to make the 
judgment it did, but rather whether reauthorization tself was a good 
idea. Justice Scalia pointedly revealed this stance when he scoffed at the 
notion that Congress had considered the claim that bailout was 
ineffective. “The question,” he said, “is whether [the claim is] right, not 
whether Congress rejected it.”42 
Ultimately, the Court voted to supplant Congress’s judgment, but not 
in the manner many expected. Rather than throw out the statute, the 
Justices simply rewrote it. The revision, which may prove to be a good 
one,43 was propelled by the belief that someone had to do something. 
Congress had been unwilling to engage in the necessary deliberation 
over the statute’s reach. The Justices accordingly believed they needed 
to step up and step into Congress’s shoes and act in its stead.44 
                                                                                                           
 39. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110–11 (2000); supra notes 7–9 and accompanying 
text. 
 40. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 11, at 148–49; Strauss, upra note 11, at 185–86; Ward 
Farnsworth, “To Do a Great Right, Do a Little Wrong”: A User’s Guide to Judicial 
Lawlessness, 86 MINN. L. REV. 227, 252 (2001) (“A preemptive strike against possible further 
transgressions by the state court . . . is an extraordinary measure. . . . The Supreme Court would 
have done better to act as the referee of referees.”). 
 41. See generally Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 42. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 37. 
 43. If they apply, small jurisdictions like the NAMUDNO plaintiff should be able to obtain 
the exemption more readily than larger units like counties and states, which must show not only 
their compliance with the bailout criteria, but the compliance of all their jurisdictional subunits. 
See, e.g., Posting of J. Gerald Hebert to Campaign Legal Center Blog, 
http://www.clcblog.org/blog_item-76.html (Oct. 5, 2006). Enabling eligible jurisdictions to 
bailout would calibrate the statute’s regulatory reach, channel resources to those places that 
most need them, and thereby make the regime less vulnerable in a future legal challenge.  
 44. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
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 NAMUDNO resembles the Bush v. Gore majority’s response to 
failed deliberation except for one crucial fact. The NAMUDNO Court 
carefully preserved a realm for congressional action. The Court 
assumed a legislative role, but occupied it only briefly, coupling its 
statutory revision with language meant to prod Congress to act more 
deliberatively in the future. 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion manages to avoid striking down the 
statute while nevertheless displacing the district court’s broad opinion 
and, along the way, making clear how he (and I believ , a solid 
majority45 of the Court) would resolve the constitutional question. 
Before invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Chief 
Justice relentlessly piles up reason after reason why the 2006 
reauthorization is constitutionally infirm.46 The opinion notably 
mentions no serious counterarguments, citing instead only to boilerplate 
language that Congress is a coequal branch and to the fact the district 
court thought the statute was just fine.47 
All this language is technically dicta, but it might be better 
understood as the operative holding—one that strike down the statute 
but stays the order until the next case in which the question is presented. 
In other words, NAMUDNO remands the VRA to Congress with a time 
limit and a warning. It puts Congress on notice that e Court will scrap 
the statute in the next case, unless something significant about the 
statutory regime will have changed by then. 
Some change may emerge from NAMUDNO’s statutory 
amendment,48 but that change is unlikely to be enough to satisfy the 
Court.  And it remains to be seen whether Congress will engage in the 
                                                                                                           
 45. At argument, Justice Kennedy voiced considerabl  skepticism about the VRA’s 
regional burdens, and has previously questioned both the VRA’s reliance on race-based 
measures and the scope of congressional power to enforc  civil rights generally. See Transcript 
of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 22; see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1244–45 
(2009); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 744–59 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). For their part, the so-called liberal Justices, offered no sustained defense of the 
statute during argument, and have previously questioned its continued importance. See, e.g., 
Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970, 1987 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 46. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2511–12 (citations omitted) (noting the “substantial 
‘federalism costs’” § 5 exacts, its broad application to all electoral changes “however 
innocuous,” the fact that “[t]hings have changed in the South,” that the racial gap in voter 
registration and turnout rates is diminished and in places nonexistent, that minority candidates 
hold elected office “at unprecedented levels,” that“[b]latantly discriminatory evasions of federal 
decrees are rare,” the dated character of the coverage formula, its weak relation to current 
conditions, and the fact that the distinct burdens imposed on covered jurisdictions “may no 
longer” be warranted). 
 47. Id. at 2513 (citations omitted). 
 48. See First Local Government Seeks Voting Rights Bailout Post Supreme Court Ruling, 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/08/first-local-government-seeks-voting-rights-bailout-
post-supreme-court-ruling.html (Aug. 4, 2009). 
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deliberation NAMUDNO effectively mandates.49 What is clear is that 
the Court did not follow Bush v. Gore all the way. After stepping in, the 
Court stepped back again. It gave Congress the opportunity to act in 
response to what NAMUDNO says. 
The decision accordingly accomplished what I had hoped it would: 
namely, the Court found a way to send the statute back to Congress for 
deliberation.50 The mechanism for accomplishing this is unexpected, to 
be sure. NAMUDNO’s stern warning promises invalidation but buys 
time with a statutory revision that looks ominously like what the Court 
did in Bush v. Gore. The Court nevertheless recognized that revision or 
retention of a statute like the VRA is a job best left to Congress. 
NAMUDNO wisely focused on getting Congress to do its job, rather 
than doing that job itself. 
CONCLUSION 
NAMUDNO’s unexpected holding was greeted with considerable 
praise.51  Bush v. Gore’s was not. This difference in reception helps 
crystallize what went wrong in Bush v. Gore. Both decisions identified a 
failure of deliberation and both saw that failure as reason to assume the 
role of the institution under review. But while the Bush v. Gore majority 
assumed that role in its entirety, the NAMUDNO Court was careful to 
preserve a space for a congressional response. The Court structured its 
opinion to encourage, to prod, and—almost certainly—to require 
Congress to act. 
Failed deliberation, to be sure, is not easily diagnosed, and the 
prospect of a false positive might itself be sufficient reason to avoid the 
inquiry entirely. Professor Amar’s remarks lend support for this view 
and indeed model what may well be a preferable form f review. 
                                                                                                           
 49. Insofar as Congress wants the § 5 regime to continue in roughly its current state, it 
should do (at least) two things. First, it should instruct the Department of Justice to identify 
jurisdictions eligible for bailout, actively encourage them to apply, and support such 
applications once filed. Second, Congress should boster the comparative case the Court has 
now made clear is needed for § 5 to survive scrutiny. While the existing congressional record 
contains comparative evidence, see Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South? Regional Variation and 
Political Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER, (A. 
Henderson, ed., 2007), Congress should collect additional, more localized evidence addressing 
the extent to which the obstacles minority voters confront in covered jurisdictions are distinct 
from the ones they face elsewhere. NAMUDNO strongly suggests that § 5’s validity rests on 
evidence of this sort, and that the statute’s prophylactic effect is not sufficient to prove the point. 
See NAMUDNO, at 2512; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 22, 28, 30, 31, 34–36, 
48–49. 
 50. Ellen D. Katz, Opinion, Voting Rights Act § 5: Leave It Up to Congress, 31 NAT’ L L. 
J. Apr. 13, 2009. 
 51. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Judicial Statesmanship on Voting Rihts, http://www.national 
journal.com/njmagazine/print_friendly.php?ID=or_2009 624_4339 (June 27, 2009). 
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NAMUDNO, however, makes clear that failed deliberation may be 
diagnosed without necessary ill effect and potentially to productive end. 
Congress may ultimately squander the opportunity NAMUDNO 
provides. The Court was nevertheless wise to have provided it. 
 
